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The first trials of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) resulted in convictions of the accused. This Article 
seeks to understand this observation by applying new institutionalist 
perspectives to decision-making processes of international criminal 
courts and tribunals. This Article argues that the first trials of such 
courts are affected by a learning curve and should be differentiated 
from other trials because of, inter alia, the novelty of the proceedings, 
the absence of previous jurisprudence, and the need to develop modi 
operandi, often from scratch. It then discusses decision-making 
patterns at the first trial, with reference to logics of action, and posits 
that, at the first trial, the logic of consequentiality is dominant, as the 
court would still not have determined its bounds of appropriateness, a 
phenomenon it terms the “first trial syndrome.” The Article concludes 
by applying this perspective to the first trial of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”). 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
International criminal courts and tribunals generally deal 
“with the most horrific, large-scale crimes human beings can 
commit.”1 The horror of these crimes, as well as the intense suffering 
by victims, have to some degree put the international community, 
including the human rights movement, “on the horns of a dilemma: 
vindicate the due process rights of the accused or adequately punish 
the perpetrator?”2 
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The framers of international criminal courts do not remain 
neutral and unaffected in the face of this dilemma but rather are 
guided by a preference for the overarching value of accountability. 
This value preference eventually crystallizes in the legal frameworks3 
of the international criminal courts themselves, giving rise to a 
structural leaning towards retribution and deterrence. Such 
frameworks are, therefore, value-laden. 
However, while the presence of these values is acknowledged, 
it is argued that they are not per se deterministic and do not operate 
to constrain judicial decision-making. Instead, the statutes of 
international criminal courts account for other relevant values, such 
as human rights and due process. Thus, in what one commentator 
considers the “interplay of meaningful acts and structural contexts,”4 
acts of judicial decision-making remain relatively autonomous from 
any structural determinants.5 
Several factors may influence the relative importance 
attached to varying, and frequently competing, sets of values. For 
instance, in respect of due process considerations, another 
commentator observed that “[w]hether or not sufficient due process 
protections exist within a system depends in part on the priority 
those protections are given relative to the consideration of other 
interests in the trial process, such as the right of victims or the 
interest of the judge in excluding hearsay evidence.”6 This clearly 
favors an approach that places stronger emphasis on due process 
protections for the accused. He posits that “it is better for the 
credibility of a budding international criminal common law to err on 
the side of stronger protections rather than weaker,”7 while decrying 
the fact that “in the early days of the ad hoc Tribunals for Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, rules of evidence and procedure were considered largely 
‘technical,’ and thus to some extent dispensable.”8 
Another scholar goes one step further and attempts to 
identify the structural limits on the growth of international criminal 
procedure and, in particular, due process rights for the accused.9 He 
                                                
3  The term “legal framework” refers to the collective of statutes, rules 
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criminal court.  
4  Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the “New 
Institutionalism,” and the future of Public Law, 82 AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE REVIEW 89, 101 (1988).  
5  SUE DAVIS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR LEADERSHIP ON THE SUPREME COURT, in SUPREME 
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INTUITIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. 
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). 
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Why Procedure Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1394 (2001) (emphasis added).  
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Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 
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proceeds to identify three broad phenomena that limit the growth of 
international due process growth: “(1) fragmentation of enforcement; 
(2) integration of conflicting legal systems; and (3) gravity of the 
crimes involved.”10  
When considered against the value of accountability, 
entrenched as it is in the legal frameworks of international criminal 
courts, the relative weakness of due process rights may bear upon the 
overall process of judicial decision-making; however, these factors 
alone may not fully explain or determine the outcome of such 
decision-making. The question, therefore, arises as to whether further 
factors influence the careful calibration and balancing of judicial 
decision-making.  
This Article will attempt to answer this question in relation to 
the first trial of international criminal courts. The reasons for 
singling out the first trial of international criminal courts will be 
expanded below. The Article will first proceed by considering a 
possible answer to the question posed above, drawn from the 
behavioralist camp, which places emphasis on the pre-formed 
preferences and attitudes of the relevant actors. 
In another article on this subject, the author evaluated and 
positioned the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) judicial decisions along conservative-statist11 and 
progressive-cosmopolitanist12 spectrums to shed more light on “the 
structural and cultural  factors  that  influence judicial policy-making  
in  national  and  international  courts,” with a view to applying  the  
lessons  to  the  ICC.13  
That author’s consideration of Akayesu, the first case 
addressed in the ICTR, is particularly illuminating. He describes the 
case as “a microcosm of the complex relationship between the 
professional norms of the community of  judges, their  past  
humanitarian advocacy, and progressive development [of 
International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”)].”14 In his analysis, the 
author attaches great weight to the pre-formed, professional norms of 
international criminal judges, arguing that these are more likely to 
favor robust judicial decision-making. 
For instance, he believed Judge Navanethem Pillay’s presence 
on the bench was critical in the amendment of the indictment in 
Akayesu to include gender-based crimes. He cited concurring 
                                                
10  Id. at 640.  
11  The conservative-statist view envisions international law as the 
product of a common demos. 
12  The progressive-cosmopolitanist view conceptualizes international 
law skeptically and in tension with norms of state security on the “right” and 
national democracy often on the “left.” 
13  Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal 
Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 377, 380, 384 (2006).  
14  Id. at 391.  
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authority and said “crucial to [the amended indictment’s] inclusion [of 
the sexual violence charge] was the presence of Judge Navanethem 
Pillay of South Africa on the bench, a judge with extensive expertise 
in international human rights law and gender-related crimes.”15 He 
then proceeded to substantiate his view by making reference to Judge 
Pillay’s extensive record of advocating for women’s causes and “her 
reception of the 2003 Women’s Rights Prize in South Africa,” 
accompanied by a $200,000 cash award.16 
While the importance of the background and preferences of 
the individual judges at international criminal trials should not be 
discounted, it is difficult to concur with an assertion that, at 
international criminal courts, “checks and balances, as well as other 
background norms which shape the perception of the appropriate 
judicial role, are either absent or, at best, ill-fitted.”17 
This Article seeks to explain patterns in judicial decision-
making, not on the basis of behavioralism but rather on the basis of 
new institutionalist perspectives, which have been propounded by 
other scholars and authors on this subject. 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
While writing about the United States Supreme Court, 
Howard Gillman observed that many behaviorists insisted for 
decades that “when deciding cases on the merits, [judges] were 
properly viewed as policy makers who were remarkably free to make 
decisions on the basis of their political preferences or ‘attitudes.’”18 
Indeed, political scientists treated the judicial institutions, such as 
the Supreme Court of the United States, as little more than “a 
collection of individuals who were pursuing their personal policy 
preferences.”19   
                                                
15  Id. at 391–92. See also Kelly D. Askin, Stefan A. Riesenfeld: 
Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under 
International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 318 (2003). 
16 Wessel, supra note 13, at 392. Similarly, others argued that “this 
judgment…might not have come about, were it not for the intervention of 
Judge Pillay….” CHERIE BOOTH, PROSPECTS AND ISSUES FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA, in 
FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 168 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003). 
17  Wessel, supra note 13, at 386. 
18  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE COURT AS AN IDEA, NOT A BUILDING (OR A 
GAME): INTERPRETATIVE INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISION-MAKING, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INTUITIONALIST APPROACHES 65 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 
1999). 
19 HOWARD GILLMAN, SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INTUITIONALIST APPROACHES in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW 
INTUITIONALIST APPROACHES 1 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 
1999). 
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However, thanks to a number of developments, scholars 
began “to shift their focus away from the long-standing [questions] of 
how institutions are affected by the personal characteristics of judges 
[toward] the question of how judges are affected by the institutional 
characteristics within which they are embedded.”20 In political 
science, the origin of the shift to ‘new institutionalist’ thinking was 
traced to James G. March and Johan P. Olsen.21  
In their 1989 book, March and Olsen first observed that “in 
most contemporary theories of politics, traditional political 
institutions, such as the legislature, the legal system” and, 
presumably, the courts of law, “have receded in importance from the 
position they held in earlier theories.”22 However, they also noted that 
“institutional perspectives have reappeared in political science,” 
reflecting an “empirically based prejudice,” which is essentially “an 
assertion that what we observe in the world is inconsistent with the 
ways in which contemporary theories ask us to think that the 
organization of political life makes a difference.”23 
 The authors attributed this ‘re-discovery’ of institutions to the 
increasing importance and complexity of institutions in contemporary 
life. They noted this renewed interest in institutions was not peculiar 
to political science but was also a recent trend in other disciplines, 
including public law.24 Another author agreed with March and Olsen 
in observing that “institutions appear to be ‘more than simply mirrors 
of social forces.’”25 That author believed that institutions, such as 
international criminal courts, “have a kind of life of their own. They 
influence the self-conception of those who occupy roles defined by 
them in ways that can give [persons] distinctively ‘institutional’ 
perspectives.”26 Further, he was mindful that moving the focus away 
from the attitudes of individual judges and towards institutions and 
structures might be too full of reification and anthropomorphism. 
However, there is no need for the new institutionalist approach to be 
taken so far. New institutionalism requires us only: 
to stress how background structures shape values and 
interests, not to speak as if they have interests of 
their own. Most of our experience certainly suggests 
that human action such as judicial decisions are 
indeed influenced by a great range of structural 
contexts – by the actor’s position within state agencies 
                                                
20  GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 66. 
21  CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE: NEW AND OLD INSTITUTIONALISMS, in SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INTUITIONALIST APPROACHES 30 (Cornell W. Clayton & 
Howard Gillman eds., 1999).  
22  JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS  1 (1989). 
23   Id.  
24  Id. at 2.  
25  Smith, supra note 4, at 95, 101.  
26  Id. at 95.  
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or political parties, by economic relations, by 
ideological outlooks, by enduring ethnic alliances, and 
so on. But the result is often that actors are faced 
with so many conflicting imperatives that they retain 
significant room for choice….27  
New institutionalism seeks to explain what shapes these 
choices. New institutionalism embraces several different approaches. 
As Gillman and Clayton noted, “there are nearly as many ways to 
think about institutions as there are practitioners of institutional 
analyses.”28  
 In a review of the literature on new institutionalism, one 
scholar identified at least three broad camps of new institutionalism: 
historical, rational choice, and ethnographic or social 
institutionalism.29 Another scholar suggested the two major 
approaches of particular relevance to judicial institutions are 
historical-interpretive and rational-choice institutionalism. Both 
approaches emphasized the importance of “assigning a more 
autonomous role to social,” political and, in this case, judicial 
institutions, and of exploring the interplay between the institutional 
role and the behavior of actors.30 As one author observed “[a]lthough 
the two versions of the new institutionalism overlap to the extent 
that they share the conviction that institutional arrangements 
matter, from there they take very different paths. To some extent it 
may be possible to develop a viable argument that there is room in 
law-and-courts scholarship for both approaches.”31 Indeed, other 
observers have called for a “‘general approach’ that would attempt to 
explain how both rules and anticipated consequences affect behavior 
and outcomes.”32 
It is precisely such an inclusive framework that March and 
Olsen set out to elaborate in their working paper “The Logic of 
Appropriateness.”33 This framework will also constitute the basis 
                                                
27  Id. at 100.  
28  GILLMAN, supra note 19, at 6.  
29  Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science 
and Sociology, 27 COMPARATIVE POLITICS, 231 (1995).  
30  SUE DAVIS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR LEADERSHIP ON THE SUPREME COURT, in SUPREME 
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INTUITIONALIST APPROACHES 135 (Cornell W. 
Clayton  Howard Gillman eds., 1999).  
31  Id. at 152 (emphasis added).  
32  Elinor Ostrom, Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: 
Toward Complementarity, 85 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 239 
(1991).  See also Robert Nalbandov, Battle of Two Logics: Appropriateness 
and Consequentiality in Russian Interventions in Georgia, 3 CAUCASIAN 
REVIEW OF INT’L AFFAIRS, 36 (2009).  
33  James G. Marsh & John P. Olson, The Logic of Appropriateness, 
(Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Working Paper No. 
4, 2009), available at 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf.   
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adopted by this Article for its analysis of judicial decision-making at 
international criminal courts. 
In elaborating on this framework, March and Olsen described 
two main logical actions that underpin institutional decision-making: 
the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality. They 
noted that:  
A theoretical challenge is to fit different motivations 
and logics of action into a single framework….If it is 
assumed that no single model, and the assumptions 
upon which it is based, are more fruitful than all the 
others under all conditions and that different models 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, we can 
examine their variations, shifting significance, scope 
conditions, prerequisites and interplay, and explore 
ideas that can reconcile and synthesise different 
models….We may also specify through what processes 
different logics of action may become dominant….We 
may also study which settings in practice enable the 
dominance of one logic over all others, for example 
under what conditions rules of appropriateness may 
overpower or redefine self-interest, or the logic of 
consequentiality may overpower rules and an 
entrenched definition of appropriateness. 
The authors proceeded to discuss the possible relationships between 
the logics of action and, after concluding that to subsume one logic as 
a special case of the other would be an unsatisfactory approach, 
argued that “the suggestion of a stable hierarchy between logics and 
between types of decisions and actors is, however, not well supported 
by empirical findings.”34  
March and Olsen observed that  
[a] more promising route may be to differentiate logics 
of action in terms of their prescriptive clarity and 
hypothesize that a clear logic will dominate a less 
clear logic. Rules of appropriateness are defined with 
varying precision and provide more or less clear 
prescriptions in different settings and situations….In 
brief, rules and interests give actors more or less clear 
behavioral guidance and make it more or less likely 
that the logic of appropriateness or the logic of 
consequentiality will dominate.35  
In the context of international criminal courts, this Article 
posits that while there is no set hierarchy between the logics of 
consequentiality and appropriateness in any given trial, it is the logic 
that provides the greatest prescriptive clarity that would seem to 
dominate judicial decision-making. Since the bounds of 
appropriateness at the first trial of an international criminal court 
would still be evolving and would not afford sufficient prescriptive 
                                                
34  Id. at 20 (emphasis added).  
35  Id. at 20–21 (emphasis added).  
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clarity, it is the logic of consequentiality that would dominate 
decision-making. This logic would resonate with, and seek to actuate, 
the value of accountability entrenched in the legal framework of the 
court in question. The recurrence of this phenomenon in the course of 
the first trial of an international criminal court may be referred to as 
the “first trial syndrome.” 
This Article now proceeds to discuss the logics of action, 
which include the logic of consequentiality and the logic of 
appropriateness. It will thereafter examine the question as to why it 
is important to differentiate between the first trial of international 
criminal courts and subsequent trials. It will then briefly discuss the 
application of these logics in the first trials of the ICTY and the ICTR. 
The Article concludes by commenting on the ICC and its first trial.  
LOGICS OF ACTION 
Logic of Consequentiality 
According to the logic of consequentiality, behavior is 
preference-driven and focuses on expectations about consequences. 
Behavior is willful, reflecting an attempt to make outcomes fulfill 
values, to the extent possible. This may be contrasted with the logic of 
appropriateness, where behavior is intentional but not willful.36 
The logic of consequentiality also contends that decision-
making is consequential and preference-based. It is consequential in 
the sense that behavior depends upon anticipations of future effects 
of current actions. Alternatives are interpreted in terms of their 
expected consequences. It is preference-based in the sense that 
consequences are evaluated in terms of personal values and 
preferences. “Alternatives are compared in terms of the extent to 
which their expected consequences are thought to serve” the values of 
the decision maker.37 
 The following sequence characterizes the decision-making 
process within the logic of consequentiality: 
1. What are my alternatives? 
2. What are my values? 
3. What are the consequences of my alternatives for my 
values? 
4. Choose the alternative that best fulfills my values. 
Logic of Appropriateness 
The logic of appropriateness involves determining the 
situation, the role being fulfilled, and then the obligations of that role 
in that situation. Rules are understood to include both written rules, 
such as laws and regulations, as well as unwritten rules, such as 
conventions, beliefs, paradigms, and cultures of the institution. 
                                                
36  JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 160–61 (1989).  
37  JAMES G. MARCH & CHIP HEATH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW 
DECISIONS HAPPEN, 2 (1994). 
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Rules define relationships among roles in terms of what an 
incumbent of one role owes to incumbents of other roles. The 
terminology is one of duties and obligations rather than anticipatory, 
consequentialist decision-making. The institution defines what is 
appropriate for a particular person in a particular situation, and this 
is transmitted through a process of socialization. When individuals 
enter an institution, they try to discover, and are taught, the rules.  
 The following sequence characterizes the decision-making 
process within the logic of appropriateness: 
1. What kind of situation is this? 
2. Who am I? 
3. How appropriate are different actions for me in this 
situation? 
4. Do what is most appropriate. 
Describing behavior as “rule-following” is only the first step in 
understanding how rules affect behavior, since rules and their 
applicability to particular situations are often ambiguous. The 
process includes the whole panoply of actions and constructions by 
which the logic of appropriateness is implemented in the face of 
conflict and ambiguity. Thus, “the criterion is appropriateness, but 
determining what is appropriate in a given situation is a nontrivial 
exercise.”38 Moreover, “the logic of appropriateness is a logic attached 
to an ‘evolving conception of propriety.’”39 “Decision makers follow 
rules,” but rules change and evolve through a number of different, 
intertwined processes.40 
Both logics require thoughtful action. They are, however, 
distinguished by the demands they make on the abilities of decision-
makers. The logic of consequentiality makes great demands on the 
abilities of decision-makers to anticipate the future and to form useful 
preferences. The logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, makes 
great demands on the abilities of decision-makers to identify the 
situation and determine the appropriate response.  
Both processes assume that decision-makers have relatively 
high reasoning skills. March underscored that “[e]ach logic is 
consistent with the glorification of the human estate and with high 
hopes for human action. Both are plausible processes for reasoning, 
reasonable decision makers.”41  
WHY DOES THE FIRST TRIAL MATTER? 
Having briefly described the logics of action that may 
influence judicial decision-making, it is important to return to the 
question of why the first trial matters and why it is important to 
distinguish the first trial from other international criminal trials—a 
distinction that is not often made in the literature. 
                                                
38  MARCH & OLSEN, supra note 36, at  25.  
39  MARCH & HEATH, supra note 37, at 77. 
40  Id.  
41  Id. at 101 (emphasis added).  
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One author depicted a telling scenario that highlights some of 
the challenges the ad hoc Tribunals may have faced at their first 
trial: 
Imagine you are a judge in a newly established 
jurisdiction where you are not bound by precedent 
and have only a set of procedures that tell you the 
accused shall have the right to remain silent and the 
right to be assisted by counsel. You then face a series 
of motions, all matters of first impression in your 
court. One is a motion to compel a handwriting 
sample, another is a motion to compel private papers, 
and a third is the introduction of an interview taken 
in the absence of counsel in another jurisdiction 
where the law prohibits counsel. The ad hoc Tribunals 
represent such a case study.42  
The first trial of an international criminal court is 
intrinsically connected with the maturation cycle of the court at issue. 
Parties and participants will be affected by the novelty of proceedings 
and will be occupied with developing norms and approaches for the 
court in question, bearing in mind its unique sui generis nature. This 
process must, moreover, be carried out in the absence of 
“international general rules on international criminal proceedings.”43 
Throughout the first trial, international criminal courts will 
be affected by a learning curve whereby they will develop and refine 
their working methods and approaches, gain invaluable experience, 
and eventually develop an indigenous sense of appropriate behavior, 
i.e. its “appropriateness.” 
While this cycle of maturation appears like an inevitable 
feature of the first trial of such courts, the literature does not often 
acknowledge this. To the contrary, this feature is often disregarded, if 
not dismissed altogether, the assumption being that international 
criminal courts require no learning curve and have a fully-fledged 
sense of appropriateness from the word go, from the first trial. 
In this respect, the available literature rarely makes 
reference to the need for a learning curve in the conduct of the first 
trial in international criminal courts. Perhaps, the reason for this is 
the tacit expectation that such courts ought to be capable of operating 
at full maturity and capacity from their inception.  
For instance, writing about the ad hoc Tribunals, scholars 
observed that, unlike some national legal systems that have matured 
slowly and gradually over hundreds of years, “international tribunals 
                                                
42  Christian DeFrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: 
Why Procedure Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1431 (2001).   
43  GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 23 (2005) 
(quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 389 (2003)). 
Although the ICTY “adopted the first ever comprehensive code of 
international criminal procedure,” this was not of universal application, but 
rather, it was “adapted to the special needs of the Tribunal….” See ILIAS 
BANTEKAS AND SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 518 (2007).  
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are expected to move from a standing start (consisting of a brief 
statute and little else) to develop an appropriate legal system and to 
hold trials delivering satisfactory results within a few years.” Making 
a similar point in relation to the ICC, another author noted that “[i]n 
terms of experience, [the ICC] would be, metaphorically, a child. But 
this child would—having regard to the seriousness of the crimes and 
their consequences—have to be immediately capable of acting as an 
adult.”44  
The expectation that international criminal courts may 
operate at full maturity from inception is empirically questionable. 
Thus, it is little wonder that authors have remarked that “[t]his asks 
a very great deal of them.”45 I would argue that the experience gained 
from the first trial cycle is essential for international criminal courts 
to be capable of acting “as an adult,” that is, to gain a sense of how to 
act appropriately. 
Various examples can be extracted from the literature that 
show the international criminal courts developing and refining their 
methods and approaches in their first trials to more ‘appropriate’ 
methods and approaches in other trials. At the first trial of the 
International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), 
which involved the Tadic case, the court consulted extensively with 
the parties on a wide range of procedural issues. As this was the first 
trial conducted by the ICTY, “the Trial Chamber sought to involve the 
parties in discussion of the practical and procedural aspects of the 
trial,” including use of courtroom technology, pre-trial briefs, 
financial arrangements for the Defense counsel, and cooperation of 
State authorities.46 
With regard to the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Rwanda (“ICTR”), scholars undertook an extensive study of eight 
trials across the three chambers of the ICTR.47 While the project itself 
did not specifically cover the first trial of the ICTR, it did 
demonstrate clearly that at least some of the working methods of the 
ICTR had in fact changed from the earlier to the later trials. For 
example, when confronted with oral motions on novel legal issues, the 
earlier trials of the ad hoc Tribunals tended to render written 
decisions informed by legal research. However, this practice quickly 
became impractical and, as “the administrative delays caused by the 
delivery of many formal written decisions” began to impair “the 
                                                
44  JAMES CRAWFORD, THE DRAFTING OF THE ROME STATUTE, in FROM 
NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
113 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003) (emphasis added).   
45  GEOFFREY NICE & PHILIPPE VALLIÈRES-ROLAND, PROCEDURAL 
INNOVATIONS IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS, in GIDEON BOAS & HIRAD ABTAHI, THE 
DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR 
RICHARD MAY 144  (Gideon Boas & Hirad Abtahi eds., 2006). 
46  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶19 
(May 7, 1997).  
47  See Rosemary Byrne, The New Public International Lawyer and the 
Hidden Art of International Criminal Trial Practice, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 243, 
273 (2004). 
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efficient operation of the Tribunals,” later trials moved towards 
rendering oral rulings for many motions instead of written 
decisions.48       
Another scholar noted that “each international criminal 
tribunal (ICTY, ICTR and ICC) has its own Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.”49 Not infrequently, these “rules of procedure and evidence 
have the daunting task of creating, rather than reflecting, a shared 
and coherent conception of process and professional roles.”50 
Moreover, as there is no overarching procedure or hierarchy between 
international criminal courts, each court constitutes a distinctive, 
self-contained legal system that cannot be assessed in comparison 
with domestic criminal courts.51 
Such international criminal courts, moreover, operate within 
the sphere of international humanitarian law and international 
criminal law, which are themselves still developing.52 International 
law is “decentralized,” in that “[t]here is no clear and uncontested 
authority in international law, no law-maker in the model of the 
‘sovereign.’”53 One author noted that the “absence of a supreme 
international criminal court means that [the work of international 
criminal courts] has occurred in a decentralized manner.”54 
The lack of a traditional source of authority blurs the 
threshold “between the non-legal and the legal.”55 Referring to the ad 
                                                
48  Id.  
49  GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 23 (2005) 
(quoting ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 389 (2003)).  
50  Byrne, supra note 47, at 248.  
51  Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 569, 584 (2000). See also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE DRAFTING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 154 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003) (stating that the ICC 
constitutes a “distinct and to a considerable extent an autonomous criminal 
justice system”).  
52  “The need for coherence is particularly acute in the context in which 
the Tribunal operates, where the norms of international humanitarian law 
and international criminal law are developing…” Prosecutor v. Zlatko 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 113 (March 24, 2000). 
53  Anne Orford, The Destiny of International Law, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 441, 443 (2004).  
54  Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting 
the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, European Journal of International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
543, 554 (2010). See also Emanuela Fronza, Commentary, in André Klip and 
Göran Sluiter, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2001-2002 
481 (2003). 
55  Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 
77 AM. J. INT’L. L. 413, 415 (1983), quoted in Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-
Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to 
Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 435  
(2006). 
 
 
42 CREIGHTON INTERNATIONAL AND Vol. 2 
 COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
hoc Tribunals, one author stated that “the normativity of 
international criminal law when these tribunals began their work 
was (and is) far from settled.”56 Another calls attention to the “the 
absence of clear international standards for the rights of the 
accused.”57 Against this background, international criminal courts, as 
sui generis systems, are thus occupied from their inception with the 
process of determining the bounds of appropriate conduct.  
It is notable, for instance, that the Appeals Chambers of both 
the ICTY and the ICTR took the approach of interpreting their legal 
frameworks broadly to allow issues of general significance, even ones 
which were not strictly material to the judgment under appeal, to be 
raised to ensure the development of its jurisprudence. 
As one author noted, “[t]his possibility of appeal, in fact, is not 
admitted in the text of the Statute.”58 Nevertheless, in the Akayesu 
appeal judgment, the ICTR Appeals Chamber allowed, and indeed 
seemed to encourage, the raising of issues of general significance, 
noting that the Tribunal was still “at an early stage of its 
development” and the consideration of such issues would therefore be 
“appropriate” since their resolution could be important for the 
development of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.59 
This is not to downplay the relevance of applicable laws and 
general principles of law “accepted by the world’s major legal 
systems,”60 which impose restrictions and provide guidance in this 
process. However, the applicable laws are not always clear,61 and 
                                                
56  Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting 
the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 543, 547 (2010).  
57  DeFrancia, supra note 42, at 1437 (emphasis added).   
58  Emanuela Fronza Commentary, in André Klip & Göran Sluiter, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 2001-2002  484 (2003). 
59  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 21  
(June 1, 2001). 
60  KNOOPS, supra note 49, at 23. The precise delimitations of such 
fundamental values and norms are context-related. Writing in relation to 
regional human rights bodies, Barnidge observed that “[i]t should not come 
as a surprise that the work of the African Commission and the Inter-
American Commission reflects, respectively, the human rights situation in 
Africa and the Americas” and consequently have interpreted such rights as 
that on the presumption of innocence, in accordance with their regional 
contexts. See Robert P Barnidge Jr., The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
Addressing the right to an impartial hearing on detention and trial within a 
reasonable time and the presumption of innocence, 4 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS. 
LAW JOURNAL 108, 120 (2004).  
61  Robinson admits that the ICTY Statute “could have benefited from 
an express provision on applicable law,” particularly one that clarified the 
applicability of national laws. See Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and 
Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 569, 584 (2000), in GIDEON BOAS & HIRAD 
ABTAHI, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF SIR RICHARD MAY 173  (Gideon Boas & Hirad Abtahi eds., 2006). 
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even such fundamental notions as those of  “fair trial” may be 
unclear.62 
 Each international criminal court represents a separate, 
autonomous, and self-contained system63—a sui generis system64—in 
relation to other contemporary or historic65 international criminal 
courts, as well as to other regional and domestic courts. Moreover, for 
a myriad of problems associated with collective action, States 
themselves fail on occasion to agree on appropriate rules, requiring 
the judges themselves “to create new, efficient norms of behavior.”66  
In their extensive analysis of the ICTY’s jurisprudence 
between 1993 and 1998, two scholars noted that:  
[t]he Statute is only a very rudimentary instrument 
which was further supplemented by the International 
Tribunal’s own Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
However, legal questions kept and keep coming up in 
the case before the Tribunal. In dealing with these 
issues, it needs to be borne in mind that there was no 
useful precedent that could guide the Tribunal in its 
work. Therefore, it was and is a major challenge to the 
Tribunal to come up with creative solutions to legal 
problems in a manner that enables the Tribunal to 
                                                
62  Safferling’s discussion as to whether the right to “fair trial” 
emanates from treaty, custom, or general principles of international law and, 
further, whether it may be classified as a civil and political right, an economic 
and social right, or neither. See CHRISTOPHER SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25–31 (2001). 
63  See ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
515 (2007). With reference to the Appeals Chamber Decision on the Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction at the ICTY, the authors note 
that the Appeals Chamber expressly confirmed the “inherent or incidental 
jurisdiction of any judicial body to determine its own competence, whether 
this is provided for in the constitutive instrument or not (that is, the so-called 
doctrine of ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz).”   
64  For instance, the ICTY held that the Statute “is a sui generis legal 
instrument and not a treaty...” See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and 
Witnesses, Case IT-94-1-PT, ¶ 18  (August 10, 1995).  International criminal 
courts constitute autonomous and self-contained legal systems. See Patrick L. 
Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 569, 572 
(2000).  
65  While the ICTY regarded the Nuremberg Tribunal as its “closest 
historical precedent,” with reference to crimes against humanity it held that 
it was not bound by the past doctrine of that Tribunal, but had to apply 
“customary international law as it stood at the time of the offences.” See 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 654, 705 
(May, 7 1997). 
66  Wessel, supra note 16, at 450.  
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function effectively and fully respects the rights of the 
accused.67 
This emerged clearly, for instance, in an ICTY decision on protective 
measures for witnesses, where the Tribunal emphasized that it had to 
“interpret its provisions within its own legal context and not rely in 
its application on interpretations made by other judicial bodies....”68 
In this context, it was observed that “whilst [the ICTY] must follow 
existing rules of international law and domestic practice, those 
principles must be applied to the particular requirements of the 
Tribunal.”69 
One scholar underscored the “challenges” arising from the 
fact that “international law on [due process is] not well developed.”70 
He points out that on account of the sui generis system of 
international criminal courts, “domestic and international norms of 
due process” may have to undergo substantial transformation before 
they could be “incorporated in a new system.”71 This point was 
brought to the forefront in Tadic where the ICTY held 
[a]lthough the Report of the Secretary-General states 
that many of the provisions in the Statute are 
formulations based upon provisions found in existing 
international instruments, it does not indicate the 
relevance of the interpretation given to these 
provisions by other international judicial bodies. This 
lack of guidance is particularly troubling because of 
the unique character of the International Tribunal.72  
Indeed, the ICTY “could have benefited from an express provision on 
applicable law,” particularly one that clarified the applicability of 
national laws.73 
                                                
67  André Klip & Göran Sluiter, The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, 1993-1998  9 (1999). 
68  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶ 28 
(August 28, 1995). 
69  Mark Mackarel Commentary in André Klip & Göran Sluiter, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1993-1998 
(1999). 
70  DeFrancia, supra note 42, at 1393. 
71  Id. at 1394. See also GEOFFREY NICE & PHILIPPE VALLIÈRES-ROLAND, 
Procedural Innovations in War Crimes Trials, in GIDEON BOAS & HIRAD 
ABTAHI, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF SIR RICHARD MAY 144  (Gideon Boas & Hirad Abtahi eds., 2006) 
(noting that the ICTY Tribunal had to find a “‘Tribunal solution’ to some of 
its procedural problems”). 
72  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Case IT-94-1-PT, ¶ 18  
(August 10, 1995) (emphasis added). 
73  Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 569, 584 (2000), in GIDEON BOAS & HIRAD ABTAHI, THE DYNAMICS OF 
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Similarly, the ICTR Appeals Chamber noted that the 
Tribunal’s legal framework contained no specific provisions on the 
issue of leading questions. The Chamber referenced domestic law in 
this area, namely the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, on 
which the Tribunal’s general rules on examination and cross-
examination of witnesses appear to be patterned. The Chamber 
underscored that the Tribunal’s rules “take on a life of their own upon 
adoption.…Interpretation of the provisions thereof may be guided by 
the domestic system it is patterned after, but under no circumstance 
can it be subordinated to it.”74  
In “the absence of clear international [procedural 
standards],”75 there is no universal understanding of what constitutes 
such basic principles as “fair trial.” This principle has to be 
interpreted and developed by the international criminal court to 
which it applies.76 What is considered “unfair” treatment will depend 
on the context of each individual international criminal court.77 “It is 
by no means obvious what ‘fair trial’ really encompasses, and what 
the singular rights within the ‘fair trial’ concept stand for.”78 
Scholars have different opinions as to what constitutes 
fairness. One author, for instance, said that expeditiousness is one 
right encompassed in a fair trial.79 Another author noted that “the 
‘conventional wisdom’ among policymakers, practitioners, and 
commentators [within and outside academia] is that war crimes 
prosecutions, particularly those at the [ICTY] and its counterpart for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”), have frequently been too slow and that it is 
essential for the future success of the ICC (and other ad hoc 
tribunals)” to be carried out more expeditiously.80 However, some 
delay may arguably be “beneficial to the pursuit of justice.”81 In this 
respect, “there is no one approach that will work for all cases. In each 
instance, the international community [and, particularly, the 
international criminal courts] must strike the right balance, 
                                                                                                                                                       
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR RICHARD MAY 173  
(Gideon Boas & Hirad Abtahi eds., 2006). 
74  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 323 
(June 1, 2001) (emphasis added). 
75  See DeFrancia, supra note 42 (underscoring the “the absence of clear 
international standards for the rights of the accused...”). 
76  Id. at 1395.  
77  CHRISTOPHER SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 42 (2001).  
78  Id. at 26.  
79  Robinson, supra note 73, at 171. 
80  Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice 
Delayed can be Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 323, 323–24 (2009). 
81  Id. at 326 (2009). Thus, while it is true that “justice delayed, justice 
denied,” it may be equally true that justice hurried, justice buried. Id. at 324 
n.1. 
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depending on all of the circumstances, between the desire for 
expediency and the need for time.”82 
From the moment of their inception, international criminal 
courts set out to develop and determine their own bounds of 
appropriate behavior, whether in relation to such basic notions as a 
fair trial and what the appropriate due process safeguards for the 
court in question are, to appropriate working methods and 
approaches. In this process, the court in question could usefully draw 
on the lessons, experiences, and expertise of other courts and 
tribunals—whether international, regional, or domestic.83 However, 
even here, it would have to determine which practices to adopt and to 
discard in accordance with its own specificities.84 It would have to be 
vigilant not to adopt the approaches of other courts wholesale, unless 
warranted, as this may impact the autonomy and sui generis nature 
of its system. Indeed, there are several examples of different 
international criminal courts adopting different approaches to similar 
substantive and procedural matters.85   
An essential milestone in the maturation of international 
criminal courts is the conduct of the first trial. While much useful 
preparatory work may be carried out in advance, the bounds of 
appropriateness may not be effectively predetermined without the 
practical experience gleaned from the first trial. Throughout the first 
                                                
82  Id. at 348. Not all commentators would agree with this approach. 
For instance, Nice and Vallières-Roland, who both worked at the ICTY Office 
of the Prosecutor, argued in favor of a twelve-month time limit for the 
determination of cases, including the biggest leadership cases. See GEOFFREY 
NICE & PHILIPPE VALLIERES-ROLAND, PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS IN WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS, in GIDEON BOAS & HIRAD ABTAHI, THE DYNAMICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR RICHARD MAY 167 
(Gideon Boas & Hirad Abtahi eds., 2006). 
83  “As a practical matter, donations from institutions such as the 
European Union have also been used to sponsor an exchange of technical 
assistance and experts between the ICTY, ICTR, ICC and Sierra Leone in 
order to ensure that each institutions [sic] is able to benefit from each other’s 
institutional experience and expertise.” GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 24 (2005). 
84  Authors noted that “in the absence of…explicit guidance, the judges 
of the ad hoc Tribunals have had cause to consider the value of different 
decisions and case law from international, regional, and national courts and 
tribunals.” See KARIM A. KHAN, RODNEY DIXON, ADRIAN FULFORD, AND 
CAROLINE BUISMAN, ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS: PRACTICE, 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 13 (3d ed. 2009). 
85  Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR disallowed complete witness anonymity 
at the trial by limiting nondisclosure to a period before the trial, generally 
not exceeding twenty-one days. As such “[t]he Rwandan Tribunal’s approach 
demonstrates that, despite the volatility in their country, effective 
approaches to witness vulnerabilities do not require that the identities of the 
witnesses be permanently withheld from the accused.” See Christian 
DeFrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure 
Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1422 (2001).  
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trial, international criminal courts gradually build their own 
repertoire of appropriate behavior through the delivery of judicial 
decisions and judgments.  
THE DOMINANT LOGIC AT FIRST TRIAL 
At their first trials, international criminal courts will take 
forward the process of determining the bounds of their appropriate 
conduct, but the logic of appropriateness will not offer sufficient 
prescriptive clarity at that stage to guide judicial decision-making. 
The bounds of appropriateness at the first trial are evolving through 
the disposition of novel issues, the gradual accumulation of 
experience, and the repertoire of decisions and judgments defining 
such bounds. In the meantime, it is the logic of consequentiality that 
dominates judicial decision-making at the first trial. This logic, with 
its pre-eminent focus on values, readily resonates with, and seeks to 
give effect to, the value of accountability, a value that is embedded in 
the legal frameworks of international criminal courts. 
The recurrence of this phenomenon during the course of a 
trial may be referred to as the “first trial syndrome.” Judicial 
decision-making at this point is primarily characterized by a 
consequential desire to give effect to the value of accountability, 
rather than by a primary concern with appropriateness.  This being 
said, it is important to point out that, in line with March and Olsen’s 
view,86 these two logics need not be mutually exclusive. Even though 
the logic of consequentiality would seem to dominate at the first trial, 
both logics may coexist and influence judicial decision-making. 
Therefore, while one would expect a number of judicial decisions at 
the first trial to be in line with the logic of consequentiality, it is 
possible, and indeed likely, that some decisions will instead follow the 
logic of appropriateness. In a sense, these may be considered the 
exceptions that prove the rule. 
While it is not possible to undertake an extensive 
examination of the case law in this Article, the following examples 
are only intended to give an indication of the logic of consequentiality 
at the first trial.  
Tadic  trial at the ICTY  
The Tadic trial at the ICTY was historic because it was “the 
first determination of individual guilt or innocence in connection with 
serious violations of international humanitarian law by a truly 
international tribunal….”87 Although Tadic was not the first person 
                                                
86  James G. Marsh & John P. Olson, The Logic of Appropriateness, 
(Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Working Paper No. 
4, 2009), available at 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2004/wp04_9.pdf.  
87  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶1 
(May 1, 1997) (emphasis added). In making this assertion, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber II noted that its predecessors, the international military tribunals 
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the ICTY sentenced,88 as the Tribunal’s first case, “[i]ts importance 
cannot be underestimated, also in symbolic terms: it is the first 
judgment of an international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg and 
Tokyo.”89 
When Tadic sought to dispute the very legality of the ICTY, 
the Trial Chamber determined that this was a “non-justiciable” issue 
and that the “Tribunal was not competent to review the decision of 
the [UN Security Council].”90 The Tribunal took the view that the 
ICTY was not a constitutional court with powers to review and 
scrutinize the legality of UN decisions by the Security Council, which 
had broad discretion in the exercise of its authority under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.91 As commentators observed, “[t]he 
importance of the jurisdiction cases for the Tribunal is self-evident. 
Had the Tribunal found it was improperly constituted or could not 
otherwise exercise jurisdiction, its continuing functioning would be 
seriously threatened.”92 
It is telling that the Appeals Chamber93 disagreed with the 
deferential approach of Trial Chamber, finding that the ICTY was 
indeed “empowered to pronounce upon the legality of its 
establishment,” finding, however, that there was no defect therein.94 
In considering this challenge, one author observed that the Chamber 
responded essentially in two ways: “[with] the military tribunal 
analogy; and on the basis that the international arena is special, and 
is not subject to international standards applicable to national 
courts.”95 
With regard to the military tribunal analogy, the ICTY 
expressly acknowledged that, in light of the specific nature of the 
Tribunal and the gravity of the crimes falling within its jurisdiction, 
rights of due process for the accused, such as Article 6 of the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), had to be “limited.” The 
                                                                                                                                                       
at Nuremberg and Tokyo, were multinational in nature, representing only 
part of the world community. 
88  The Tribunal’s first sentencing judgment came from a guilty plea. 
89  André Klip & Göran Sluiter, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1993-1998  11 (1999).  
90  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 
15 (May 15, 1997). 
91  Theo van Boven, Commentary in André Klip & Göran Sluiter, THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1993-1998  
(1999). 
92  André Klip & Göran Sluiter, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1993-1998  10 (1999). 
93  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense 
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶  3–6 (October 2, 1995). 
94  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 
15, 16  (May 7, 1997). 
95  JAMES CRAWFORD, The Drafting of the Rome Statute, in FROM 
NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
129 (Philippe Sands ed., 2003).  
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Tribunal held that: “[the ICTY] is adjudicating crimes which are 
considered so horrific as to warrant universal jurisdiction. The 
International Tribunal is, in certain respects, comparable to a 
military tribunal, which often has limited rights of due process and 
more lenient rules of evidence.”96  
With regard to the lesser applicability of domestic due process 
standards, the Tribunal held:  
[the] appellant has not satisfied this Chamber that 
the requirements laid down in these . . .conventions 
[the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the American Convention on Human Rights] 
must apply not only in the context of national legal 
systems but also with respect to proceedings 
conducted before an international court….97  
The logic of the Chamber’s decision in this case and, particularly, its 
readiness to accept a watered-down standard of due process 
protections for the accused at an international criminal trial, 
indicates a logic of consequentiality with its focus on the value of 
accountability for war criminals. One scholar protested that “[i]t 
seems wrong in principle to say that international criminal process is 
subject to a lesser standard than national criminal process…How can 
my right to be tried by an impartial and independent tribunal 
established by law be abrogated because the tribunal is established at 
the international level?” 98  
Interestingly, a former President of the ICTY wrote an article 
subsequent to this statement and cautioned that  
[c]are must be taken lest the modifications [of due 
process rights at international criminal courts] go so 
far as to curtail the rights of the accused under 
customary international law. There is no basis for 
interpreting the ICCPR [International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights] as though it provided for 
                                                
96  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Case IT-94-1-PT, ¶ 28  
(August 10, 1995). 
97  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
¶ 42  (October 2, 1995).  
98  CRAWFORD, supra note 95, at 131 (emphasis added). The author 
notes that the Appeals Chamber went on to give reasons why it could be 
considered to be established by law, and he concludes that “we can accept the 
conclusion of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, if not all of its 
reasoning.” Id. at 133. Another author argued that “there may be a bias 
toward taking actions that make it more likely that an individual will be 
found guilty and punished . . . .[However, the author finds that] [c]ontrary to 
the expectations of ICTY critics, it does not appear that the judges’ verdicts 
are influenced by ‘political’ factors.” James Meernik, Victor’s Justice or the 
Law? Judging and Punishing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 47 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 140, 147, 153 
(2003). 
 
 
50 CREIGHTON INTERNATIONAL AND Vol. 2 
 COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
one set of rights applicable at the municipal level, and 
another at the international level.99  
As this was its first trial, the Tribunal at this stage had still 
not determined its bounds of appropriate conduct. It may well be 
argued that in reaching its decision the ICTY was guided by the logic 
of consequentiality, which sought to secure the prosecution of the 
accused and give effect to the value of accountability entrenched in 
the legal framework of the court, even at the cost of watered-down 
standards of due process protections. 
Akayesu  in the ICTR 
Akayesu100 was the first case heard before the ICTR and the 
first international decision to interpret the definition of genocide.101  
Not only was it the first international war crimes trial in 
history to try and convict a defendant for genocide, it was also the 
first judgment in which the accused was found guilty of genocide for 
crimes which expressly included sexualised violence, as well as the 
first time that an accused was found guilty of rape as a crime against 
humanity.102  
In this case, the ICTR allowed and encouraged the prosecutor 
to charge the defendant with the crime of genocide based on the act of 
rape.103 The prosecutor submitted the indictment against Akayesu on 
February 13, 1996, and it was confirmed on February 16, 1996. The 
trial on the merits then commenced on January 9, 1997.104 However, 
the indictment was subsequently amended in June 1997 to 
incorporate, inter alia, gender-based crimes.105  
As has been discussed above, some scholars attach 
considerable importance to the background and preferences of Judge 
Navanethem Pillay in the subsequent amendment of the Akayesu 
indictment.106 However, the decision to amend the indictment may 
also be seen as indicating the logic of consequentiality at this first 
trial. When Judge Pillay stated that she was “extremely dismayed 
                                                
99  Robinson, supra note 73, at 584.  
100  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 1 
(September 2, 1998). 
101 William Schabas, Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF 
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that we’re hearing evidence of rape and sexual violence against 
women and children, yet it is not in the indictments,”107 her 
statement may be seen as indicative of a desire to give effect to the 
value of accountability, as entrenched in the legal framework of the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal’s decision to allow such an amendment may, 
therefore, be seen as consequential towards this end.   
When the issue of the amended indictment was raised on 
appeal, the Appeals Chamber considered, in particular, the lack of 
notification to the accused of the prosecutor’s intention to amend and, 
tellingly, it found it necessary to recall that “every accused is entitled 
to a fair hearing.”108 However, while the Appeals Chamber conceded 
that “had it been in the Trial Chamber’s shoes it would have probably 
acted otherwise” in dismissing this ground of appeal, it concluded 
that because the defendant’s right to be heard was not totally denied 
and the defense had not raised further objections, “even if the rights 
of the accused had been violated, there is cause to find that the 
Defense had renounced all right to invoke such violations before the 
Appeals Chamber.”109  
CONCLUSION 
The above examples are intended only to provide an 
indication of where the logic of consequentiality may have influenced 
decision-making at the first trial. The above cases can provide 
guidance for the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
“The first trial at the ICC, the Lubanga case, began in early 
2009 after numerous postponements.”110 This case was significant 
both for the fact that it was the first test case for victims’ 
participation before the ICC111 and for the role it could play in helping 
to bring accountability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). It “will also help to shape practices before the ICC…that could 
influence how [the Court] handles future trials.”112  
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Since its opening, the Lubanga trial has been beset by various 
challenges, not least by the decision to stay proceedings against the 
accused sine die on two separate occasions, both due to an abuse of 
process on the part of the prosecutor.113 On both occasions, the Trial 
Chamber ordered an unconditional stay of proceedings and release of 
the accused from detention, subject to a five-day limit for the 
prosecutor to file an appeal, pending the judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber. On the second occasion, the Chamber held that the 
prosecutor’s position constituted a “profound, unacceptable and 
unjustified intrusion into the role of the judiciary…[and while] these 
circumstances endure, the fair trial of the accused is no longer 
possible, and justice cannot be done….”114 
The Chamber earlier held that where the constituent 
elements of a fair trial are ruptured, “the interest of the world 
community to put persons accused of the most heinous crimes against 
humanity on trial, great as it is, is outweighed by the need to sustain 
the efficacy of the judicial process as the potent agent of justice.”115 
However, on both occasions, Lubanga’s release was averted. It may be 
noteworthy that, on previous occasions, requests for the interim 
release of Lubanga were refused on account of the great risk that he 
would flee the jurisdiction of the Court.116  
The Appeal Chamber’s decision to reverse the orders for the 
release of the accused on both occasions, despite the presumption of 
innocence117 and fair trial concerns expressed by the Trial Chamber, 
may have been inspired by the logic of consequentiality, which flowed 
from a desire to ensure the fulfilment of the value of accountability. 
Naturally, the value of accountability would have suffered a severe 
blow had Lubanga been released and evaded the Court’s jurisdiction. 
This would have been particularly damaging for the ICC considering 
that this was its first trial and it was trying to develop acceptable 
norms in its trial practice. 
Although it is still early, and the Lubanga trial is pendente 
lite, these various decisions may indicate the first trial syndrome, 
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whereby judicial decision-making is characterized by a consequential 
desire to give effect to the value of accountability, rather than 
necessarily by the dictates of “appropriateness,” which would still be 
evolving at the time of a first trial and, as such, would not afford 
sufficient prescriptive clarity. However, as cases proceed through 
international court systems, and courts mature, we will likely see a 
greater role for the logic of appropriateness, as this logic gains 
greater prescriptive clarity and becomes better able to inform and 
shape judicial decision-making within such courts.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
